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TO LIKE OR NOT TO LIKE: FRALEY V. 
FACEBOOK’S IMPACT ON CALIFORNIA’S 
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY STATUTE IN THE AGE 
OF THE INTERNET 
Francesca Grea 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
More than one billion people use Facebook each month.1 
Approximately one out of every seven people in the world has a 
Facebook account, making this social networking site one of the 
most popular global tools to date.2 
While becoming a member of Facebook is free, the site 
generates revenue by selling advertising space.3 Given Facebook’s 
enormous reach, advertisers recognized its tremendous potential to 
promote their products worldwide.4 However, as advertisers 
developed new marketing techniques specifically for use in social 
media, users complained that their legal rights—particularly their 
statutory right of publicity—were being infringed.5 Internet privacy 
has become a growing concern, and users are becoming more 
cautious of how their personas are being exploited by social media 
 
  J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Communication and 
Business Law, May 2011, University of Southern California. I would like to sincerely thank 
Professor Evan Gerstmann for his invaluable guidance, Professor Jay Dougherty for being my 
entertainment law guru, Nicole McGuire for her editorial prowess, and the whole Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review team. I would also like to thank my parents, Richard and Yvonne Grea, for 
their endless encouragement and support, without whom my education would not have been 
possible.  
 1. Number of Active Users at Facebook Over the Years, YAHOO NEWS (May 1, 2013), 
http://news.yahoo.com/number-active-users-facebook-over-230449748.html; Dave Thier, 
Facebook has a Billion Users and a Revenue Question, FORBES (Oct. 4, 2012, 12:41 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidthier/2012/10/04/facebook-has-a-billion-users-and-a-revenue-
question/. 
 2. Thier, supra note 1. 
 3. Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 790 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 4. Id. at 792. 
 5. See id. 
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sites.6 In fact, some Facebook users felt so strongly that Facebook’s 
advertisers were violating their right of publicity that they finally 
took a stand by filing a class action suit against Facebook, which 
ultimately resulted in an approximately twenty million dollar 
settlement for the users.7 
In Fraley v. Facebook, Inc.,8 Facebook users claimed that the 
site used their “names, photographs, likenesses and identities to sell 
advertisements for products, services, or brands without obtaining 
[their] consent” through Facebook’s “Sponsored Stories”9 feature.10 
The suit survived the defendant’s motion to dismiss, as District 
Judge Lucy H. Koh determined that the plaintiffs had made a 
preliminary showing of economic injury from the unauthorized uses 
of their personal information.11 
This Comment considers what precedential effects Fraley will 
have on future right of publicity cases dealing with advertising on 
social-networking sites, and how issues of consent and 
newsworthiness may affect users’ rights. While Fraley settled before 
the court rendered a decision as to Facebook’s liability,12 the court 
explored users’ statutory and common-law rights of privacy and their 
ability to control how others use their images and likenesses.13 These 
issues have become urgent at a time when people are sharing more 
and more about themselves on the Internet. Part II discusses the 
relevant facts from the Fraley case. Part III addresses California’s 
right of publicity statute, California Civil Code section 3344. More 
specifically, Part III-A explores the issue of consent and discusses 
whether users consent to allowing others to exploit their personal 
information by merely providing it to social media sites. Part III-B 
focuses on the carve-out in the California statute—the 
“newsworthiness” exception14—and contemplates when users can be 
 
 6. See id. at 790; see Cohen v. Facebook, Inc. 798 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1094 (N.D. Cal. 
2011); In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 7. Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Revised Settlement at 1, Fraley v. Facebook, 
830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 11-01726). 
 8. 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 797. 
 11. Id. at 810. 
 12. Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Revised Settlement, supra note 7, at 1. 
 13. Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 803–10. 
 14. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (West 2012). 
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considered public figures and thereby potentially lose privacy 
protections. Part IV analyzes the key issues in the Fraley case 
surrounding newsworthiness and consent. Finally, Part V concludes 
that Facebook does not receive genuine consent before it uses 
members’ identities and likenesses; instead, it employs complicated 
consent requirements, and other techniques, to escape liability for its 
improper use of these personal attributes. Thus, Part V proposes that 
Facebook should better explain its advertising techniques to its users, 
and offers suggestions as to how Facebook can receive genuine 
consent from its users’ attributes 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In Fraley, Facebook members Angel Fraley, Paul Wang, Susan 
Mainzer, J.H.D., and W.T. filed a class action suit against Facebook 
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California.15 The plaintiffs claimed that by “misappropriating their 
names and likenesses for commercial endorsements without their 
consent,” Facebook violated the members’ statutory rights of 
publicity under California Civil Code section 334416 and California’s 
Unfair Competition Law, Business and Professions Code section 
17200.17 
One of Facebook’s controversial advertising techniques was its 
use of “Sponsored Stories,” a feature that was activated for all 
members by default.18 These stories were a form of paid advertising 
that appeared on a member’s Facebook “news feed,” displaying a 
friend’s name and photo next to the advertiser’s logo, and stating that 
the friend “liked” the advertiser19 or its product.20 These Sponsored 
 
 15. Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 785, 790. 
 16. California Civil Code § 3344(a) states: “Any person who knowingly uses another’s 
name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or 
goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, 
goods or services, without such person’s prior consent . . . shall be liable for any damages 
sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 
2012). 
 17. Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 790, 792. 
 18. Id. at 791. 
 19. A user “likes” an advertiser or its products when he or she clicks on a link underneath a 
photo for the advertisement or on the advertiser’s Facebook page that displays a small “thumbs 
up” sign, paired with the words “Like” or “Like This Page.” Id. at 790–91. Upon clicking the 
link, Facebook generates the Sponsored Story message and displays it on the user’s friends’ news 
feeds. Id. 
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Stories appeared on members’ Facebook pages after the user who 
seemingly endorsed the product or service clicked “like” on the 
advertiser’s Facebook page or any affiliated page, when the member 
used the “post” or “check-in” feature, or when the user opened an 
application whose content somehow related to the advertiser.21 
For example, plaintiff and Facebook-user Angel Fraley claimed 
that she visited Rosetta Stone’s Facebook page, where she was 
required to click the “like” button before she could use a free 
software demonstration.22 After she did so, Fraley’s picture appeared 
on her friends’ news feeds alongside Rosetta Stone’s logo and text 
stating that “Angel Frolicker23 likes Rosetta Stone.”24 The other 
Fraley class representatives described similar experiences after 
“liking” a company’s Facebook page.25 
The plaintiffs claimed that through the Sponsored Story system, 
Facebook essentially turned users’ “likes” into advertising revenue 
by creating unauthorized personal endorsements of the advertisers’ 
products and services without giving users the ability to “opt out” of 
the endorsement.26 They asserted that they did not even know of this 
Sponsored Story service and did not realize that their actions would 
be “interpreted and publicized by Facebook as . . . endorsement[s].”27 
They further claimed that they were effectively lured into 
clicking the “like” button—before they even had a chance to find out 
if they actually liked the product—in order to “receive discounts on 
products, support social causes, or to see a humorous image.”28 The 
plaintiffs asserted that millions of Facebook users had been injured 
and should have been compensated under California law for being 
“unpaid and unknowing spokepersons [sic] for various products.”29 
Facebook subsequently filed a motion to dismiss under Rules 
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).30 Facebook claimed, among numerous other 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 791. 
 23. Angel Fraley’s registered user name on Facebook was “Angel Frolicker.” Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 791–92. 
 26. Id. at 792. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 793–94. 
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grounds for dismissal, that the plaintiffs “fail[ed] to state a claim for 
misappropriation under California Civil Code § 3344 because they 
[did not] allege[] any actionable injury, they consented to the use of 
their names and likenesses, and the republished content is 
newsworthy under § 3344(d).”31 However, Judge Koh, the presiding 
judge, denied Facebook’s motion and found that the plaintiffs did in 
fact have a colorable cause of action, as Facebook members were 
“likely to be deceived into believing [they] had full control to 
prevent [their] appearances in Sponsored Story advertisements while 
otherwise engaging with Facebook’s various features, such as 
clicking on a ‘Like’ button, when in fact members lack such 
control.”32 Koh stated that dismissal was improper because the 
defendant used the plaintiffs’ personal, albeit newsworthy, 
information for commercial purposes, removing the defendant from 
the umbrella of protection under section 3344(d).33 Koh also 
reasoned that the issue of consent remained a “disputed question of 
fact,” thus making dismissal improper.34 
III.  MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER SECTION 3344: CALIFORNIA’S RIGHT 
OF PUBLICITY STATUTE 
California recognizes two actions for violation of one’s right of 
publicity: one at common-law for commercial misappropriation and 
one under California Civil Code section 3344.35 The common-law 
cause of action and statutory cause of action are virtually identical.36 
Both require “(1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) 
the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s 
advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) 
resulting injury.”37 In addition to these elements, section 3344 
requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant knew of the use of 
 
 31. Id. at 795. 
 32. Id. at 814–15. For a more in-depth description of Judge Koh’s reasoning, see infra Part 
IV. 
 33. Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 805. 
 34. Id. at 806. 
 35. Id. at 803. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. (quoting Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Ct. App. 1983)). 
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the plaintiff’s name or likeness and that there was “a direct 
connection between the alleged use and the commercial purpose.”38 
A.  Consent: Defining the Nebulous Term in the Age of the Internet 
While most of the above elements are not hotly contested in the 
Fraley case, consent stands out as a major issue. Generally, consent 
is defined as an “agreement, approval, or permission as to some act 
or purpose, esp[ecially] given voluntarily by a competent person.”39 
The term has also been defined as “voluntarily yielding the will to 
the proposition of another . . . [The] result of coming into harmony or 
accord.”40 These definitions suggest that giving consent is “an act of 
reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing as in a 
balance the good or evil on each side. It means voluntary agreement 
by a person in the possession and exercise of sufficient mental 
capacity to make an intelligent choice to do something proposed by 
another.”41 Giving genuine consent is “an act unclouded by fraud, 
duress, or sometimes even mistake.”42 Recently, courts have been 
faced with determining what constitutes true consent. The court in 
Cohen v. Facebook43 homed in on the idea of consent on the Internet, 
addressing whether users offer consent by agreeing to a website’s 
terms of service and what the scope of that consent is.44 Other 
important questions that have not been addressed in depth are who 
can consent on the Internet and whether minors have the ability to 
consent away the right to use their personal information. Both E.K.D. 
v. Facebook45 and I.B. v. Facebook,46 both decided in 2012, were 
among the first cases to explore these issues. 
 
 38. Id. The requirement for “lack of consent” is somewhat counterintuitive in that it creates a 
presumption that the plaintiff consented to the use. Thus, the requirement forces the plaintiff to 
make a prima facie showing that there was no consent rather than requiring the defendant to raise 
consent as a defense. Interview with Professor Evan Gerstmann, Professor of Political Science 
and Law, Loyola Marymount Univ., in L.A., Cal. (Feb. 2012). 
 39. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (9th ed. 2009). 
 40. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 305 (6th ed. 1990). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. 798 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 44. See generally id. 
 45. E.K.D. ex rel Dawes v. Facebook, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 894 (S.D. Ill. 2012). 
 46. I.B. ex rel Fife v. Facebook, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 2d 989 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
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1.  Cohen v. Facebook: Consenting to a Website’s Terms of Service 
The court in Cohen v. Facebook explored what constitutes 
consent in the age of the Internet by considering the consequences of 
users consenting to a website’s terms of use.47 In Cohen, Facebook 
argued that the plaintiffs—Facebook users—gave appropriate 
consent to the use their likenesses when they agreed to the 
company’s “Statement of Rights and Responsibilities” upon joining 
the social media site.48 Every user, Facebook argued, has the ability 
to opt out of having personal information shared by enabling privacy 
settings on the site.49 However, the court was unconvinced by this 
argument, explaining that it was “far from clear” that Facebook 
could simply rely on the terms of service to escape legal liability for 
improper uses of the plaintiffs’ personas.50 The court stated that 
“substantial questions would remain in this instance as to when 
various versions of the documents may have appeared on the website 
and the extent to which they necessarily bound all plaintiffs.”51 
Facebook claimed that a provision in their Statement of Rights 
“unambiguously gives Facebook the right to use any photos, 
including Plaintiffs’ profile photos, in any manner on Facebook, 
subject to Users’ privacy and application settings.”52 However, the 
court did not agree with Facebook that the Statement of Rights 
provided such a clear catchall release of liability.53 Instead, the court 
interpreted the clause as an ambiguous grant that gave Facebook a 
worldwide license to use members’ photos and insulated Facebook 
from copyright infringement claims for the reproductions, but not as 
a defense against improper use for commercial purposes.54 
Additionally, the court was quick to note that nowhere in this clause 
did Facebook claim the right to use members’ names.55 
The court concluded outright that “nothing in the provisions of 
the Terms documents to which Facebook has pointed constitute[d] a 
 
 47. See Cohen v. Facebook, Inc. 798 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 48. Id. at 1094–95. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1094. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1095. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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clear consent by users to have their name or profile picture shared in 
a manner that discloses what services on Facebook they have 
utilized, or to endorse those services.”56 Although users did consent 
to something upon use of the site, the scope of their consent was not 
as all-encompassing as Facebook argued.57 The court made very 
clear that while members of the social media site did consent to 
sharing their personal information with their Facebook friends and 
potentially even with users of the site at large (depending on what 
privacy restrictions were in place), they certainly did not consent to 
this particular use.58 
2.  Minors Consenting to Terms of Service 
Some twenty million minors in the United States have a 
Facebook account.59 About seven-and-a-half million of those users 
are under the age of thirteen, Facebook’s minimum age to hold an 
account.60 Roughly five million of those minors are under the age of 
ten.61 With so many minors using Facebook, it is important to 
determine how much power, if any, these adolescent users have to 
give away the rights to their names and likenesses. While it is 
unclear whether children under the age of thirteen can consent to 
anything due to their status as prohibited users, courts have 
addressed this issue for minors ages thirteen to seventeen.62 In 
E.K.D. v. Facebook, the court found that while minors are generally 
able to disaffirm contracts entered into during minority, they could 
not disaffirm portions of the contract without disaffirming the 
contract in its entirety.63 Therefore, underage users could not 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1096. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Ki Mae Heussner, Underage Facebook Members: 7.5 Million Users Under Age 13, ABC 
NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/underage-facebook-members-75-million-users-age-13 
/story?id=13565619 (last updated May 10, 2011). 
 60. Heussner, supra note 59. Per the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 
which dictates protections for minors, Facebook bans children under the age of thirteen from 
creating a Facebook account. Under 13 Year Olds On Facebook: Why Do 5 Million Kids Log In If 
Facebook Doesn’t Want Them To?, REUTERS, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/19/under 
-13-year-olds-on-facebook_n_1898560.html (last updated Nov. 19, 2012, 5:12 PM). 
 61. Heussner, supra note 59. 
 62. See I.B. ex rel Fife v. Facebook, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 2d 989 (N.D. Cal. 2012); E.K.D. ex 
rel Dawes v. Facebook, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 894 (S.D. Ill. 2012). 
 63. E.K.D., 885 F. Supp. 2d at 899. 
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disaffirm Facebook’s Terms of Service if they continued to use the 
social media site.64 However, I.B. v. Facebook took a different 
approach, concluding that minors can still disaffirm the entire 
contract, even after receiving the benefit of the bargain by continuing 
to use Facebook.65 
B.  The Exception: Newsworthiness and Its Interplay with the Public 
Figure Doctrine 
Although consent remains a pivotal element in a right-of-
publicity action, the California legislature has made an important 
exception that tracks First Amendment rights to freedom of speech: 
the “newsworthiness” exception.66 This exception is codified in 
California Civil Code section 3344(d).67 Section 3344(d) states that 
“a use of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in 
connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or 
account, or any political campaign, shall not constitute a use for 
which consent is required under subdivision (a).”68 The exception 
extends to matters of the press and the reporting of recent events.69 
However, “the information does not have to be ‘news’ in the strict 
sense of the word,”70 nor does it have to be used in a not-for-profit 
manner.71 Courts have broadly interpreted the meaning of 
“newsworthy,” including in it “any matter of public concern.”72 “It 
extends . . . to the use of names, likenesses or facts in giving 
information to the public for purposes of education, amusement or 
enlightenment, when the public may reasonably be expected to have 
 
 64. See id. at 899–900; Eric Goldman, Facebook’s “Browsewrap” Enforced Against Kids—
EKD v. Facebook, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING L. BLOG (Mar. 16, 2012), http:// 
blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/03/facebooks_brows.htm. 
 65. I.B., 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1000–03, 1013. Unfortunately, Judge Koh did not address the 
issue of minors consenting in Fraley and, thus, did not provide any insight as to the treatment of 
this issue. See Fraley v. Facebook, 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 66. Fraley v. Facebook, 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 804 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 67. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (West 2012). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Zac Locke, The Diminishing Power of California’s Rights of Privacy and Publicity, L.A. 
LAWYER, June 2010, at 12 available at http://www.lacba.org/files/lal/vol33no4/2711.pdf. 
 71. Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Group, No. CV 98–0583 (CWx), 1998 WL 882848, at *4 
(C.D. Cal. 1998); Locke, supra note 70, at 12.  
 72. Michaels, 1998 WL 882848, at *7. 
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a legitimate interest in what is published.”73 Courts have found that 
“there is a public interest which attaches to people who, by their 
accomplishments, mode of living, professional standing or calling, 
create a legitimate and widespread attention to their activities.”74  
Thus, this brings to mind the public figure doctrine.75 Public 
figures fall into two categories.76 First, there are “all-purpose” public 
figures.77 These are people who have reached a widespread level of 
fame, such as celebrities.78 Additionally, there are “limited purpose” 
public figures, “who voluntarily inject[] [themselves] or [are] drawn 
into a specific public controversy, thereby becoming a public figure 
on a limited range of issues.”79 If one is found to be a public figure, it 
stands to reason that information about that person would more likely 
be newsworthy information, especially in light of the leniency in 
defining the term.80 
In the age of the Internet, people are more accessible than ever. 
Therefore, it is important to consider what exactly raises someone to 
the level of a public figure in a social networking context. Achieving 
such status may limit a person’s ability to seek redress for right of 
publicity violations if the contested use falls within the 
newsworthiness exception.81 In other words, the reproduction of 
one’s name or likeness may not be actionable, even if the use is for 
profit.82 In order to rise to the status of a public figure, courts have 
routinely required that a person have some level of fame in his or her 
community, or at least some level of notoriety.83 Within this 
definition of a public figure, courts seem to look for some kind of 
 
 73. Id. at *4 (quoting Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998)). 
 74. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350 (Ct. App. 1983). 
 75. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 76. Ampex Corp. v. Cargle, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 804 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 81. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (West 2012). 
 82. S. Michael Kernan, Privacy in Social Media: The Right of Publicity, 34 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 363, 375 (2012). 
 83. Matthew Lafferman, Comment, Do Facebook and Twitter Make You a Public Figure?: 
How to Apply the Gertz Public Figure Doctrine to Social Media, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 199, 216 (2012–2013). 
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assumption of risk or voluntariness in putting oneself into the public 
eye.84 
In the context of social media, users are constantly putting many 
aspects of their personalities and lives on display for their friends—
and sometimes even the world—to see (if no privacy settings are 
enabled).85 It stands to reason that constant posting on social media 
sites, such as Facebook, can elevate users to the status of public 
figures in some contexts.86 But what level of notoriety is actually 
required? While many courts have not specifically addressed the 
question of who is a public figure in relation to Internet activity, 
some have tackled the question and are using different approaches to 
attack this problem.87 
In Tipton v. Warshavsky,88 an unpublished opinion, the Ninth 
Circuit held that a web user elevated himself to the status of a limited 
public figure when he “voluntarily involved himself in public life by 
inviting attention and comment on [a website].”89 Additionally, the 
court in Ampex Corp. v. Cargle90 stated “electronic communication 
media may constitute public forums” reasoning that “[w]eb sites that 
are accessible free of charge to any member of the public where 
members of the public may read the views and information posted, 
and post their own opinions, meet the definition of a public forum.”91 
Each case illustrates the “inherently public approach.”92 Under this 
view, the Internet is a public forum because Internet activity in itself 
is sufficient to constitute voluntary activity under the limited-purpose 
public figure test.”93 By requiring that an individual simply publish 
information on the Internet, these courts set a relatively low 
threshold for what it considered voluntarily placing oneself in the 
 
 84. Lafferman, supra note 83, at 216–17. 
 85. See Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 791. 
 86. See Lafferman, supra note 83, at 229 (arguing that the availability of people and 
information online presents public figure doctrine problems). 
 87. Lafferman, supra note 83, at 235–36. 
 88. Tipton v. Warshavsky, 32 F. App’x 293 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 89. Lafferman, supra note 83, at 237 (quoting Tipton, 32 F. App’x at 295). 
 90. 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
 91. Id. at 869. 
 92. Lafferman, supra note 83, at 237. Lafferman discusses the “inherently public approach,” 
which some courts have adopted. 
 93. Id.  
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public eye.94 This loose requirement should raise a red flag for users 
of social networking sites such as Facebook, as their consent may not 
be required before users all over the web see their “endorsements” 
for products and services that, in reality, they do not know much 
about.  
IV.  ANALYSIS 
This section takes a closer look at two of the major issues the 
Fraley court focused on—newsworthiness and consent—and also 
identifies important areas that the court failed to address in its 
discussion. 
A.  Newsworthiness 
In response to the plaintiffs’ allegations, Facebook argued that 
consent was not required for the Sponsored Stories because the 
plaintiffs’ information met the “newsworthiness” exception.95 
Facebook argued that this First Amendment defense encompassed 
the Sponsored Stories for two reasons. First, Facebook contended 
that the users’ names and photos were newsworthy matters because 
the Sponsored Stories included content such as Facebook’s 
members’ “accomplishments, mode[s] of living, professional 
standing” and similar information, as well as users’ expressions of 
their taste in products and services.96 Additionally, Facebook argued 
that users’ likenesses were newsworthy because among their circles 
of friends on the website, they took the status of “public figures.”97 
Thus, Facebook claimed that it was exempt from needing members’ 
consent to use their likenesses in the Sponsored Stories.98 
Although the court did not ultimately find this argument a strong 
enough reason to grant Facebook’s motion, the court gave some 
deference to the principle behind it.99 Effectively, Facebook argued 
that Facebook users are public figures in some contexts and, as a 
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result, they are entitled to fewer privacy protections because of this 
status.100 The court recognized that the plaintiffs essentially asserted 
a sort of “celebrity” status among their Facebook friends in order to 
support their claims, but then tried to deny that status so as to not 
trigger the First Amendment exception.101 The court noted that the 
plaintiffs could not have it both ways; if they wanted to claim 
economic injury from Facebook’s exploitation of their notoriety 
among their circle of friends, then that same notoriety should, 
theoretically, have turned them into public figures, who were subject 
to the newsworthiness exception.102 However, the court was careful 
to note that even newsworthy information can run afoul of section 
3344(d) if it is used improperly for a “commercial rather than 
journalistic purpose.”103 The court drew a careful line, noting that a 
defendant’s commercial use of information takes the information 
beyond the scope of the privacy privilege and the protection of 
section 3344(d).104 This distinction ultimately led the court to 
conclude that the Sponsored Stories fell outside the limited sphere of 
the newsworthiness exception due to their commercial rather than 
journalistic nature, despite users’ status as local “celebrities.”105 
B.  Consent 
Facebook also argued that even if consent was required because 
the publication of the Sponsored Stories did not fall under the 
newsworthiness exception, Facebook users consented when they 
signed up to use the site and accepted the site’s Terms and 
Conditions.106 Facebook contended that the Terms stated that users 
could modify their privacy settings in order to limit the exploitation 
of their likenesses relating to commercial and any other undesirable 
uses.107 Facebook acknowledged that users could not specifically opt 
out of the Sponsored Stories feature.108 However, the site claimed 
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that members were still afforded reasonable control over the use of 
their images by their ability to “exercise control over whether to take 
actions that can become Sponsored Stories, whether individual 
actions may be republished as Sponsored Stories, and the precise 
audience to whom their Sponsored Stories are shown.”109 The court 
declined to address this at the motion to dismiss phase and stated that 
it was still an outstanding question of fact.110 
However, applying the reasoning used in Cohen, it seems that 
Facebook will fail in hiding behind its terms of service to shelter the 
company from liability. While users did in fact consent to the terms 
of using the site, their consent was not so all-encompassing.111 It had 
a limited scope. It is hard to imagine that users could have 
reasonably and intelligently agreed to a service that was not even in 
existence at the time they signed up to use the site.112 Consent 
assumes that there was a degree of “reason, accompanied with 
deliberation” and a balancing that allowed the person to make an 
informed decision.113 Members were not afforded an opportunity to 
give meaningful consent. Simply giving users the ability to alter their 
privacy settings to limit having their information being used in 
Sponsored Stories does not eliminate the need for consent. 
Consent also assumes that there is no fraud or mistake involved 
in the decision-making.114 Enticing users to “like” a company or its 
products with promotions and discounts without fully informing 
users that they will then be “endorsing” those products is not 
meaningful consent. Instead, advertisers seemingly jump the gun 
without giving users a chance to find out if they actually liked the 
product or not before boasting positive reviews of the company’s 
products and services to their friends.115 In reality, the members may 
not have “liked” the company or its product at all, but rather wanted 
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access to information, such as free demonstrations, photographs, 
special offers, or even promotional prizes.116 
While the court decided that the scope of the consent seemed to 
be limited, an issue that was not addressed by the court was whether 
the act of “liking” something created an added element of consent to 
have information used in Sponsored Stories. However, without 
appropriate knowledge about the consequences of “liking” an 
advertiser’s company or product, it stands to reason that a user 
cannot give meaningful consent and do an appropriate balancing to 
make an informed decision. Additionally, when users are tempted by 
promises of free products and enticing promotions, the additional 
step of “liking” a product may be done more out of curiosity than out 
of consent.117 This deceitful advertising technique is a clever way to 
sidestep the true issue of whether or not users want to give 
advertisers permission to use their personas to endorse products that 
they truly do not know much about until after they have “agreed” to 
the endorsement. 
Another issue the court left open was a minor’s ability to 
consent to having his or her persona used for commercial purposes. 
Two of the named plaintiffs in Fraley were minors.118 Facebook 
preemptively attempted to settle this case before it proceeded any 
further in the court system, and the proposed settlement did in fact 
address the issue of minors offering consent.119 However, the first 
proposal was less than satisfactory for the plaintiffs.120 Of the 
proposed changes in the company’s Terms and Conditions that 
would affect minors, the settlement required that minors give 
parental consent before they could be featured in a Sponsored 
Story.121 The minor plaintiffs objected to this change, claiming that 
while it addressed the “the fundamental issue that minors lack the 
capacity to provide consent . . . simply asking them to confirm they 
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have parental consent is insufficient.”122 While the underage 
plaintiffs do have reason to stress their inability to provide 
meaningful consent and to demand change from the company, case 
law suggests that they may not stand on firm ground unless they are 
willing to stop using the site altogether—a tradeoff that many minors 
may not be willing to make. 
V.  PROPOSAL 
The problem of garnering genuine consent can be approached in 
numerous ways so as to strike a compromise between Facebook, its 
advertisers, and its users. In the age of the Internet, where people are 
consistently confronted with ploys and plots to obtain their consent 
to one thing or another, it is important for companies to be crystal 
clear about what exactly they are asking users to agree to. Facebook 
could make relatively simple changes that would provide such 
clarity—for example, continuously updating its Terms and 
Conditions and requiring current users to accept each revision as it is 
made. Furthermore, Facebook should provide transparency to its 
users by highlighting the changes it periodically makes to the Terms 
and Conditions. It is no secret that Internet users scan through terms 
halfheartedly, if at all. Addressing such changes up front and in 
boldface would help ensure that users are aware of what they are 
consenting to. Additionally, Facebook could add another safeguard 
to make sure users know the consequences of “liking” something by 
inserting a disclaimer on members’ pages near the sponsored 
advertisements. The disclaimer should explicitly state that “liking” 
the advertiser or its products will result in a Sponsored Story being 
generated and the person’s name being used.  
Users seem to be most concerned about what Facebook does 
with their personal information without their knowledge. Therefore, 
an alternative approach would be for Facebook to send members 
requests to use their information in Sponsored Stories—or, at least, 
notifications warning users that Facebook intends to publish their 
personal data in a Sponsored Story—before actually doing so. This 
way, members could take greater control over the potential use of 
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their personas by denying the request or tightening their privacy 
settings to limit what information is released through the stories. 
Additionally, in order to entice users to consent to being 
featured in the Sponsored Stories, Facebook could offer incentives 
for their participation. Instead of activating the Sponsored Stories 
feature by default upon registration for the site, members would only 
trigger Sponsored Stories by explicit agreement, through a 
notification or request from Facebook or the advertiser. To 
encourage users to accept the notification or request, Facebook and 
its advertisers could present users with the option of receiving 
benefits, such as discounts, promotions, coupons, or other rewards, 
for endorsing the product through a Sponsored Story. 
Each of these tactics would help to ensure that Facebook users 
know exactly what they are agreeing to and understand how their 
personal information will be used in advertisements. Facebook 
should not be permitted to hide behind its lengthy, muddled, and 
inadequate Statement of Rights and Responsibilities or its sizeable 
bank account to shield itself from liability for improperly using its 
members’ personas. The company must be pushed toward getting 
genuine consent from its members. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
More people now use Facebook than were on the planet two 
hundred years ago.123 In 2010, Facebook’s user base exceeded the 
population of the United States, growing large enough to become the 
third largest “country” on earth.124 Growing at an average rate of 77 
percent per year, by 2016 Facebook may claim the title as the largest 
“country” on earth.125 It is no surprise that advertisers want to utilize 
this enormous potential for global exposure. However, it is 
imperative that this social networking powerhouse obtain the 
necessary consent from its users so as not to violate their right of 
publicity. 
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